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Abstract
China's ﬁnancial system conforms to the stereotype described by the theory 
of ﬁnancial repression. The banking sector is dominated by state ownership, 
interest rates are controlled by the government and credit allocation is heavily 
inﬂuenced by political factors rather than by commercial motives. The sever-
ity of repression in China's ﬁnancial sector increased to an unprecedented 
level after 2008, when the Chinese government poured enormous ﬁnancial 
resources into the economy as a response to the ﬁnancial crisis. Financial 
repression has seriously damaged the sustainability of China's economy by 
decreasing economic efﬁciency. However, ﬁnancial repression may be main-
tained in the future despite its harmful effects because for the Chinese Com-
munist Party control over ﬁnancial resources is a powerful weapon that can 
be used when necessary to address certain economic, political or social prob-
lems that may endanger its rule. Given the importance of ﬁnancial resources 
to the rule of the Party, it is difﬁcult to imagine that it will eventually adopt 
a liberalization strategy and relinquish its control over the ﬁnancial system.
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Introduction
Financial repression theory has its origins in the work of McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973). McKinnon and Shaw argue that numerous 
countries, including developed nations,1 but particularly those that are 
in the process of developing, have historically restricted competition in 
the ﬁnancial sector through government intervention and regulation. 
According to their argument, a repressed ﬁnancial sector discourages 
both saving and investment because the rates of return are lower than 
what could be obtained in a competitive market. In such a system, 
ﬁnancial intermediaries do not function at their full capacity and fail 
to efﬁciently channel savings into investment, thereby impeding the 
development of the overall economic system.
The inﬂuence of ﬁnancial repression has been tested by numerous 
empirical studies, many of which identiﬁed a negative association 
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between ﬁnancial repression and certain economic variables, such as 
savings rates, investment and economic growth.2 Given its harmful ef-
fects, a liberalization-oriented policy that attempts to relax or abolish 
ﬁnancial repression has gained momentum among policymakers in 
developing countries. As a result, since the 1980s a gradual removal of 
ﬁnancial restraints has been witnessed worldwide (Abiad, Detragiache 
and Tressel 2010). 
However, China appears to be going against the tide of ﬁnancial 
liberalization. After 40 years of economic reform (particularly some 
signiﬁcant liberalization-oriented reforms in other markets), China's 
ﬁnancial markets remain heavily repressed. According to Huang and 
Ji (2017: 29), 'China's ﬁnancial liberalization is among the lowest in the 
world'. The banking sector continues to be dominated by state owner-
ship; in addition, interest rates are still controlled by the government 
and credit allocation is heavily inﬂuenced by political factors rather 
than commercial motives. All these features will, as suggested by the 
ﬁnancial repression theory, contribute to the misallocation of ﬁnancial 
resources, social welfare loss and, ﬁnally, a slowdown of growth or 
even economic recession. However, China has experienced remarkable 
economic growth over the past four decades and has surpassed Japan 
as the world's second-largest economy. 
China's case raises interesting and important questions. How serious 
is China's ﬁnancial repression? How has China been able to achieve 
remarkable success in terms of economic development despite its 
repressed ﬁnancial system? And why does the Chinese government 
liberalize other markets, such as product and labour markets, but fail 
to liberalize its ﬁnancial system? We attempt to answer these questions 
in this study. More speciﬁcally, we describe the status quo of China's 
ﬁnancial system, with special attention to its repressed nature, explore 
the connection between ﬁnancial repression and China's economic 
growth, and, ﬁnally and most importantly, reveal the role of the do-
mestic political environment, particularly the survival strategy of the 
Chinese Communist Party (hereafter the Party), in shaping China's 
ﬁnancial landscape.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following sec-
tion describes the landscape of China's ﬁnancial sector, with particular 
attention to its repressed nature. We then discuss the connection between 
ﬁnancial repression and China's economic growth, and the inﬂuence of 
the ﬁscal stimulus programme adopted by the Chinese government in 
2008 on China's ﬁnancial system . The article next explores the political 
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factors that may contribute to the distortion of China's ﬁnancial sector, 
before drawing out conclusions in the ﬁnal section.
Financial Repression in China 
Dominance of State Ownership in the Banking Sector
China has an extremely high level of state ownership in the banking sector. 
For example, Naughton (2017a) reports that by 2014 the Chinese govern-
ment controlled at least 85 per cent of banking sector assets. Government 
ownership tends to politicize resource allocation. Therefore, the top 
executives in Chinese state-owned banks are confronted with two differ-
ent and often conﬂicting missions: to advance the government's political 
objectives and to optimize the bank's ﬁnancial performance. When these 
two missions contradict each other, the former always dominates. 
State ownership also creates a moral hazard problem for bank man-
agers because they are ultimately not accountable for losses that result 
from the loans they have extended and therefore have little incentive 
to develop skills and expertise in credit evaluation. As a result, state-
owned banks are shown to suffer from inefﬁciency, low proﬁtability 
and a lack of caution in credit issuance, particularly when they are 
compared with joint-stock banks and city commercial banks (Berger, 
Hasan and Zhou 2009; Jiang, Yao and Feng 2013; Jiang, Yao and Zhang 
2009; Lin and Zhang 2009).  
However, there are also studies showing that the performance of 
state-owned banks has improved after China's ﬁnancial reform. For 
example, Firth et al. (2009) ﬁnd that banks tend to allocate loans to ﬁrms 
with higher proﬁtability, more experienced and incentive-compatible 
CEOs and more independent corporate boards, which implies that the 
banks use commercial judgements in loan-extension decisions. Hsiao, 
Shen and Bian (2015) show that the operating efﬁciency of Chinese 
domestic banks (including the state-owned banks) is catching up with 
that of foreign banks.
Misallocation of Credit 
After several decades of economic reform, China's non-state sector has 
replaced state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the key driver of China's 
economic growth. However, the non-state sector, particularly private 
enterprises, has been discriminated against in terms of credit access 
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and availability. For example, Li, Yue and Zhao (2009) report that for 
unlisted manufacturing ﬁrms in China, state ownership is signiﬁcantly 
and positively associated with a ﬁrm's likelihood of having long-term 
debt (but not short-term debt) and a higher leverage ratio. Based on a 
data set including more than 20,000 Chinese ﬁrms from 1998 to 2005, 
Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche (2010) ﬁnd that private ﬁrms 
signiﬁcantly relied on their cash ﬂow to ﬁnance investments, which 
is evidence of credit constraints, whereas SOEs did not. Financial 
discrimination against private enterprises appears to have continued 
or even worsened after 2008, when the Chinese government adopted a 
gigantic stimulus plan (Herrala and Jia 2015; Johansson and Feng 2016; 
Roberts and Zurawski 2016).
Internal and informal ﬁnancing, such as retained earnings, trade credit 
and private loans, have thus played a more important role in ﬁnancing 
the growth of private ﬁrms. Cull, Xu and Zhu (2009) ﬁnd that (poorly 
performing) SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to ﬁrms with 
less privileged access to loans via trade credit, which could be considered 
a substitute for loans that these target ﬁrms were unable to obtain from 
formal credit markets. In addition, credit discrimination may force 
private ﬁrms to seek foreign investors; by establishing cross-border 
relationships with foreign ﬁrms, private domestic ﬁrms can bypass 
the ﬁnancial and legal obstacles that they face at home (Héricourt and 
Poncet 2009; Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche 2010).
Interest Rate Controls
The liberalization of interest rates in China came relatively late in the 
sequence of economic reform and has followed a gradual approach. 
What deserves more attention in this study is that China's central 
bank appears to adjust the benchmark interest rates in an asymmetric 
manner in response to inﬂation (Liu, Margaritis and Tourani-Rad 2009). 
More speciﬁcally, the central bank adjusts deposit and lending rates 
downward more quickly than it adjusts them upward. When inﬂation 
increases, the rigidity of interest rates leads to lower or even negative 
real interest rates. This trend is more obvious after 2004 (Lardy 2012).
The direct result of the central bank's approach to setting nominal 
interest rates is that, on average, household interest earnings have 
been far less than they would have been in a more liberalized ﬁnancial 
environment.3 Lardy (2012) reports that whereas from 1997 to 2003 the 
real return on a one-year bank deposit was consistently positive and 
averaged 3 per cent, since the beginning of 2004 the real return on a 
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one-year deposit has been negative for approximately half the time 
and averaged –0.5 per cent. In contrast, the corporate sector beneﬁts 
greatly from such a monetary policy. There was a marked decline 
in real lending rates after 2003. Whereas from 1997 to 2003 the real 
rate on a one-year loan averaged 6.8 per cent, since the beginning of 
2004 the real interest rate on a one-year loan has averaged only 1.7 
per cent, thus artiﬁcially lowering the cost of capital and encouraging 
investment in projects that have much lower returns (Lardy 2012).
The low cost of capital in China has made the country an anomaly 
when compared with other countries, both developed and developing. 
For example, based on data for 30,000 ﬁrms across 53 economies, 
Geng and N'Diaye (2012) show that the real cost of capital—deﬁned 
as a weighted average of the real cost of bank loans, bonds and 
equity—faced by Chinese listed ﬁrms is below the global average. 
The authors further argue that China's capital appears to be 
particularly cheap compared with its productivity. An estimate of 
the marginal product of reproducible capital (i.e., capital adjusted 
for land) shows that China's return to capital is well above its real 
loan rate, which makes China an outlier on the international scene.
Recent Reforms
The Chinese government appears to have attempted to liberalize its 
ﬁnancial system in recent years. For example, since 2012 interest rate 
liberalization advanced at an accelerated pace. The lending rate ﬂoor, 
which was expanded to 0.7 times the benchmark rate in 2012, was 
removed in July 2013. In theory, this allowed ﬁnancial institutions to 
independently determine lending rates based on market forces. From 
November 2014 to October 2015, the deposit rate ceiling was increased 
three times and was ﬁnally removed in October 2015. Therefore, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016: 5) announced that 'interest 
rate liberalization was formally completed … these reforms help move 
China towards an independent, market-based, monetary policy'.
However, the practical effects of the reform are limited. Tan, Ji and 
Huang (2016: 2) claim that 
the de jure completion of interest rate liberalization has generated little 
impact on the Chinese ﬁnancial system … commercial banks still stick to 
the ofﬁcial benchmark rates set by the PBOC, although they are not required 
to do so anymore, at least in theory. Both deposit rates and loan rates have 
stayed nearly the same as those before reform. Without any real change in 
the pattern of ﬁnancial institutions' behaviour, the recent reforms have not 
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yet put an end to ﬁnancial repression … there is no sign of diminishing 
distortion of capital allocation.
Similarly, in the area of ﬁnancial openness, reform also leads to mixed 
outcomes. The Chinese government has indeed taken measures to reduce 
foreign exchange interventions, loosen capital account controls and 
encourage the internationalization of the Chinese currency (renminbi). 
For example, China has gradually widened the band around which 
the currency could trade relative to the ﬁxing rate set by the central 
bank, loosened capital account controls by partially relaxing restric-
tions on portfolio investment and cross-border lending and borrowing, 
and pursued internationalization of renminbi along two interrelated 
tracks—that is, the trade track and the ﬁnance track (Cohen 2017; Gold-
man Sachs 2016; IMF 2017b). A milestone of China's ﬁnancial openness 
was reached in October 2016, when renminbi was included in the IMF's 
special drawing rights basket.
However, the improvements in China's ﬁnancial openness are lim-
ited. Despite recent reforms, China still has one of the strictest systems 
of capital control in the world. As a response to the intensiﬁcation of 
capital outﬂows (US$648 billion in 2015 and US$640 billion in 2016, trig-
gered by worries regarding China's serious debt problem and gloomy 
economic prospects), the Chinese government has tightened its control 
over capital ﬂow since mid-2016. Should economic growth continue to 
slow and conﬁdence in the stability of renminbi erode, it is unlikely that 
the capital account will be meaningfully opened beyond current levels 
in the near future. This in turn means that the process of renminbi's 
internationalization will soon reach a dead end. Slowing down the pace 
of ﬁnancial openness, despite its efﬁciency losses, is understandable, as 
further ﬁnancial openness will expose China's ﬂawed ﬁnancial system 
to international capital ﬂows and endanger the nation's ﬁnancial and 
economic stability. Financial openness needs a solid foundation, such 
as an efﬁcient and robust banking sector, which China lacks. 
In general, progress towards ﬁnancial liberalization after the Third 
Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, which was held in November 2013 
and aimed to bring about new momentum for China's economic reform, 
has been limited. A recent estimation of reform performance after 2013 
concludes that 'it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the reform proc-
ess overall has stumbled and is in serious trouble' (Naughton 2017b: 3). 
More speciﬁcally, Naughton argues that 
the prospect of a large package of interrelated reforms achieving success 
together has disappeared, and many complex multi-stage reforms are 
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in limbo… A number of individual reforms have been watered down… 
Most tellingly, ﬁnancial reforms of the stock market and capital account 
liberalization have been spectacular failures. (2017b: 3)   
Economic Consequences of Financial Repression
Effects on Efﬁciency and GDP Growth
China's repressed ﬁnancial policies have severely undermined its 
prospects of economic growth by misallocating ﬁnancial resources. For 
example, Bas and Causa (2013) ﬁnd that aligning ﬁnancial policies in 
China to the average level observed in Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries would result in labour 
productivity gains of 6.5 per cent in the manufacturing sector. Brandt, 
Tombe and Zhu (2013) ﬁnd that between 1985 and 2007 capital and 
labour misallocation lowered aggregate non-agricultural total factor 
productivity (TFP) by an average of 20 per cent, with capital misalloca-
tion accounting for more than half of the total loss. Wu (2015) reports a 
higher estimation and shows that policy distortions in ﬁnancial markets 
caused an aggregate TFP loss of 19.2 per cent. 
Therefore, ﬁnancial repression has signiﬁcant implications for China's 
gross domestic product (GDP). Several empirical studies show that 
ﬁnancial repression has been harmful to China's economic growth. For 
example, Guariglia and Poncet (2008) report that the indicators meas-
uring the level of state intervention in China's ﬁnance sector—such as 
the share of state-owned banks in total bank credit and the ratio of total 
state-owned bank credit to GDP—are negatively associated with GDP 
growth, physical capital accumulation and productivity growth. By 
contrast, Peng et al. (2014) construct an index of ﬁnancial liberalization 
that combines eight aspects of China's ﬁnancial reform process between 
1978 and 2004 and report that liberalization has a signiﬁcant positive 
effect on growth in the short run and on accumulated growth in the long 
run. Similarly, Anzoategui, Chivakul and Maliszewski (2015) show that 
China's GDP could be boosted by approximately 5 per cent by liberal-
izing interest rates and removing credit discrimination. 
Thus, how did China achieve such miraculous economic performance 
despite its inefﬁcient ﬁnancial system? Chinese ﬁnancial repression has 
in fact caused economic inefﬁciency. However, such inefﬁciency may 
be counterbalanced by other forces and, therefore, the detrimental ef-
fects of ﬁnancial repression are limited. For example, Xu and Gui (2013, 
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2014) demonstrate that China's repressed ﬁnancial system acts as a 
double-edged sword: on the one hand, credit misallocation and state 
ownership in the banking sector retard economic growth by damaging 
economic efﬁciency; on the other hand, interest rate controls contribute 
to economic growth by lowering the cost of capital, and exchange rate 
distortion promotes economic growth by stimulating exports. In other 
words, although the private sector, which is the key driver of China's 
economy, is hurt by credit discrimination, it can still beneﬁt from other 
ﬁnancial repression policies, such as a low interest rate environment 
and exchange rate undervaluation. China's ﬁnancial repression policies, 
therefore, appear to subsidize the entire corporate sector (including 
both SOEs and private enterprises) at the cost of household sectors, 
even though SOEs beneﬁt disproportionately from such a subsidy. In 
general, it may be argued that before 2008 China adopted a modest 
ﬁnancial repression policy which, as suggested by Hellmann, Murdock 
and Stiglitz (1998), may not have been very harmful (and may even have 
been helpful) for China's economy. 
Effects on Debt Accumulation, Financial Stability and 
Financial Risks
China's economy was severely impaired by the global ﬁnancial crisis 
of 2008. In response, on 5 November 2008 the Chinese government 
announced a massive ﬁscal stimulus programme (the 'CNY 4 trillion 
stimulus programme'). The stimulus package appears to have effectively 
boosted China's economic growth, at least in the short term. Unfortu-
nately, this success was achieved at the cost of intensifying China's 
ﬁnancial repression. The basic logic of the programme is to stimulate 
China's economy by mobilizing SOEs, particularly local government 
ﬁnancing vehicles (LGFVs), which, with the (almost unlimited and 
unconditional) help of the banking sector, primarily invest in certain 
low-yielding projects, such as infrastructure. Therefore, China's growth 
pattern has become much more credit driven, SOE-favoured and state 
led than before 2008.  
On the asset side of the programme, investments made by both 
LGFVs and traditional SOEs have played a key role in reinvigorating 
China's economy after the shock of the ﬁnancial crisis (Deng et al. 2015; 
Shi and Huang 2014; Wen and Wu 2014). Unfortunately, the efﬁciency 
of these investment projects is doubted (Cong and Ponticelli 2017; 
Shi, Guo and Sun 2017; Shi and Huang 2014). In addition, as a result 
of China's stimulus programme, total industrial production in China 
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nearly doubled between 2007 and 2013 (Wen and Wu 2014). Because of 
the rapid expansion of production, capacity utilization in key sectors 
of the economy has declined signiﬁcantly, which suggests that there is 
substantial excess capacity in the economy (IMF 2012; Nie et al. 2016). 
Therefore, the ratio of 'zombie ﬁrms' has increased signiﬁcantly, which 
leads to serious solvency problems in certain industries, and exposes 
Chinese banks to the increasing risk of non-performing loans (EIU 2017; 
IMF 2016; Prasad 2016).
On the liability side, bank loans played a dominant role in ﬁnanc-
ing LGFVs and other SOEs before 2012. Bai, Hsieh and Song (2016) 
report that 90 per cent of local government off-balance-sheet spending 
(through LGFVs) in 2009 was funded by bank loans. Similarly, Zhang 
and Barnett (2014) show that bank loans accounted for approximately 
80 per cent of total local government debt by 2010, which is equivalent 
to CNY 12.7 trillion. 
Because of the surge of bank credit in 2009, the Chinese government 
realized that the policy-driven credit boom could grow out of control 
and therefore, after 2012, tightened monetary policy and discouraged 
bank lending to LGFVs and certain industries. As a result, LGFVs and 
other ﬁrms were forced to turn to other ﬁnancing vehicles, particularly 
to the shadow banking system. 
China's shadow banking has developed at an astonishing speed 
since 2008.4 It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the details of 
these activities. Rather, we outline just three important features of the 
sector. First, the prosperity of China's shadow banking system is the 
direct result of the stimulus programme (Acharya, Qian and Yang 2016; 
Chen, He and Liu 2017; Chen, Ren and Zha 2016). Second, the shadow 
banking system is closely intertwined with the formal banking sector 
(Elliott, Kroeber and Qiao 2015). Third, the development of China's 
shadow banking system may sow the seeds of ﬁnancial risk, or even 
crisis, in view of its operating pattern, which has been characterized by 
'less stringent regulation, lower safety margins, riskier business models, 
and opaque business methods' (Elliott and Qiao 2015: 18).  
Perhaps more importantly, because of the credit boom before 2012 
and the subsequent rise of the shadow banking sector, China's debt 
accumulation has reached a stunning level. Total debt held by the non-
ﬁnancial corporate sector doubled from 68 per cent of GDP to 136 per 
cent in 2015 (McKinsey Global Institute 2016). Altogether, China's total 
debt (including the debt of the ﬁnancial sector) has nearly quadrupled 
since 2007, increasing from US$7.4 trillion to US$28.2 trillion by the 
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second quarter of 2014, and increasing from 158 per cent of GDP to 282 
per cent (McKinsey Global Institute 2015). This ratio is higher than the 
aggregate ratio for advanced economies (279.2 per cent) and far above 
the average of emerging markets (excluding China) (186.5 per cent) 
(EIU, 2017).  
The rapid growth in credit and accumulation of debt in China has 
generated concern about its ﬁnancial stability and prospects of economic 
growth. For example, based on the credit-to-GDP gap, which is deﬁned 
by the Bank for International Settlements as the difference between the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-run trend, and is generally used to 
predict the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis, the IMF has warned several 
times that China's ﬁnancial stability may face a serious threat in the near 
future (IMF 2015, 2016, 2017a). 
In fact, even the Chinese authorities themselves expressed a similar 
concern. On 9 May 2016, an article was published in the People's Daily, 
which is known as the mouthpiece of the party-state. The article cited an 
'authoritative person' (who is believed to be Liu He, the right-hand man 
of Chinese president Xi Jinping), who claimed that 'it is neither possible 
nor necessary to force economic growth by leveraging up' and warned 
that there might be a possibility of systemic ﬁnancial crisis if the process 
of leveraging up ﬁnally gets out of control.5 President Xi Jinping also 
urged others to 'prevent ﬁnancial risk' and 'maintain ﬁnancial security' 
at several public events.6 
Accordingly, the Chinese government has taken certain measures 
to address potential ﬁnancial and economic risks. So far, the most 
important policy framework is the so-called 'supply-side structural 
reform' (SSSR), which was ﬁrst mapped out in December 2015 at the 
Central Economic Work Conference, a high-level annual meeting of 
policymakers and senior Party leaders, including Xi Jinping himself. 
This conference identiﬁed ﬁve areas of focus under SSSR, including 
cutting (industrial) overcapacity, destocking (property inventory), 
(corporate) deleveraging, lowing corporate costs and improving 
'weak links'. While there has been progress in implementing SSSR 
in certain areas, such as reducing overcapacity in the steel and coal 
sectors, overall performance is not encouraging. Naughton (2017c: 
8) concludes that 'SSSR and reforms in general have faced unprec-
edented opposition that has stalled their implementation'. The most 
serious problem with the implementation of SSSR, as a report issued 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) states, is that 'rather than 
supporting the market-friendly reform agenda set out in 2013, SSSR 
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in many respects runs contrary to it … the programme rests too much 
on political will for its enforcement. At present, political support for 
the programme is strong, but SSSR could quickly fall apart were it to 
ebb' (EIU 2017: 28).  
A Political Economy Framework for Understanding 
China's Financial Repression 
The (under)development of the ﬁnancial sector cannot be fully under-
stood without considering the broader political environment. Politics 
may determine ﬁnancial development directly by inﬂuencing the 
direction of credit allocation and the access to equity ﬁnance on the 
micro level as well as the performance of the ﬁnancial sector on the 
macro level, and indirectly by distorting the design and operation of 
ﬁnancial regulatory institutions. Clearly, 'political choices deeply af-
fect the development and operations of the ﬁnancial system' (Haber 
and Perotti 2008: 48). Therefore, we explore the relationship between 
politics and ﬁnancial repression in the Chinese context in the follow-
ing section.   
Financial Repression and the Party's 'Growth-oriented' 
Strategy 
It is difﬁcult to understand the emergence and continuation of ﬁnancial 
repression in China without considering the survival strategy of the 
Party, particularly its 'pro-growth' or 'growth-oriented' strategy which 
has been in effect since the reform era began at the end of the 1970s. 
Economic growth has been a top priority because of the simple fact that 
the Party lacks legitimacy in the democratic sense; therefore, it has been 
forced to seek performance-based legitimacy by continuously improving 
the living standards of Chinese citizens (Xu 2011). To clarify, it can be 
argued that there is an implicit social contract between the Party and 
the Chinese population that the latter will not press vigorously for more 
democratic forms of government if the former delivers high levels of 
economic growth and prosperity.
Economic growth may help to maintain the Party's dominance not 
only by improving its legitimacy but also by strengthening its capacity 
for repression and addressing certain challenges to political stability, 
such as unemployment. Repression has been identiﬁed as one of the 
key aspects of the Party's survival (Dickson 2016; Pei 2012). With the 
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help of economic growth, China's spending on public security rose by 
93 per cent between 2008 and 2013 (Dickson 2016). It was reported that 
China's spending on internal public security (CNY 549 billion) overtook 
national defence (CNY 533.4 billion) in 2010.7 Clearly, economic growth 
is the most effective tool that can be used to address the unemployment 
problem (Lam, Liu and Schipke 2015). Workers, particularly migrant 
workers who lack access to China's welfare system, must rely on their 
job-related incomes to support themselves (and their family members); 
an economic recession that wipes out millions or even tens of millions 
of jobs will place these individuals in a desperate situation and, 
subsequently, they would become a threat to social stability. Therefore, 
it is understandable that the Chinese government responded to the 
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 at such speed and scale. 
Whereas empirical evidence regarding the connection between 
ﬁnancial repression and China's economic growth has mixed implications 
(see our discussion in the previous section), it is understandable that 
the Party attempted to boost economic growth through a policy of 
ﬁnancial repression. The impact of ﬁnancial repression on economic 
growth can be illustrated by referring to the production function, Y 
= AF (K, L), where Y is the output, K is capital, L is labour and A is a 
productivity parameter. Indubitably, ceteris paribus, the lower the cost 
of capital, the stronger the incentive to accumulate it (investment, I = 
ΔK), and as more capital is accumulated, the potential for economic 
growth increases. Therefore, ﬁnancial repression arguably may pro-
mote economic growth by lowering the cost of capital (for example 
through interest rate control) and therefore encourage investments by 
the corporate sector. 
Indeed, our previous studies ﬁnd that, generally, ﬁnancial repression 
(measured by interest rate control, credit misallocation, dominance of 
state-owned banks and exchange rate manipulation) is beneﬁcial to 
China's economic growth. Xu and Gui (2013, 2014) ﬁnd that a decrease 
in the real interest rate and an increase in credit extended to SOEs will 
stimulate investment. Moreover, Xu and Gui (2013, 2014) report that 
although the effects of credit misallocation and dominance of state-
owned banks on economic growth are harmful, other dimensions of 
ﬁnancial repression—such as a low interest rates and devaluation—
actually promote economic growth. Therefore, 'when the pro-growth 
effects of ﬁnancial repression outweigh its anti-growth effects, the overall 
inﬂuence of ﬁnancial repression may be beneﬁcial, rather than harmful, 
to economic growth' (Xu and Gui 2014: 92).
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Financial Repression and the Party's Patronage System 
Pursuing legitimacy through economic growth is certainly not the 
Party's only survival strategy; it also adopts other strategies, such as 
establishing a patronage system through which loyalty and support 
can be bought by material and non-material beneﬁts and co-opting new 
social groups (such as private entrepreneurs) whose economic power 
and social inﬂuence may ultimately become a threat to the dominance 
of the Party if they are free from its control. Both strategies demand an 
economic system in which economic rents (subsidies) can be created 
continually, distributed selectively and protected effectively. Financial 
repression policies are a part of this narrative.
State-related institutions, particularly SOEs, are perhaps the most 
important mechanism through which economic rents and loyalty can 
be exchanged (Pei 2012). On the management level, the CEOs of SOEs, 
particularly of SOEs controlled by the central government, are rewarded 
for their loyalty and support with high incomes and elite positions inside 
the party-state (Brødsgaard 2012; Lin and Milhaupt 2013). Employees of 
SOEs, compared with their counterparts in the private sector, have an 
average wage level that is much higher (CNY 23,565 versus CNY 14,096 
in 2007), and the growth rate of their average wage is faster (259.8 per 
cent between 1992 and 2007 versus 178.2 per cent over the same period) 
(Ge and Yang 2014). Therefore, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that employ-
ees in the state sector show more support for the party-state than their 
counterparts in the private sector (Chen and Lu 2011).
Motivated by the economic and political beneﬁts (and constrained by 
the control and discipline of the Party), SOEs serve the interests of the 
Party enthusiastically and effectively. For example, studies have shown 
that SOEs help to achieve social stability by maintaining employment 
(Huang, Li and Lotspeich 2010; Ljungqvist et al. 2015) and rehabilitate 
the economy by carrying out massive investment projects (Deng et al. 
2015).  
Given their inherent inefﬁciency and heavy policy burden (such as 
needing to maintain employment), it is difﬁcult for SOEs to survive—
much less make a proﬁt—without governmental support. Indeed, 
China's SOEs were so inefﬁcient that almost half reported losses in the 
1990s. The situation has changed drastically during the past decade, and 
the proﬁtability of the SOEs has increased by an impressive amount. 
However, the major driving force behind the proﬁtability of China's 
SOEs consists of certain distorted economic policies that favour SOEs 
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at the expense of private enterprise development and greater social 
welfare. Financial repression policies are part of the explanation.
According to a report issued by a Beijing-based independent think 
tank, from 2001 to 2009, SOEs paid CNY 305.98 billion less annual 
interest, on average, than they should have done (Unirule Institute 
of Economics 2011). For those nine years, CNY 2,753.85 billion that 
should have been paid as interest was instead appropriated by SOEs 
and included in their nominal proﬁts. Our own study ﬁnds that the 
rents from ﬁnancial repression were greater than the proﬁts earned by 
SOEs in most years from 1978 to 2012 if we assume that the real market 
interest rate is 10 per cent; even if we follow Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson 
(1996) and use 2 per cent as the interest rate spread in most years, the 
ﬁnancial repression rents remain greater than 30 per cent of the proﬁts 
earned by SOEs (Xu and Gui 2016). 
Financial Repression and the Party's Co-optation Strategy
As argued by Dickson (2001), when Leninist parties such as the Chinese 
Communist Party abandon the class struggle for the sake of economic 
modernization, they typically switch from an exclusionary to an inclu-
sionary, or co-optive, strategy. In the post-Mao period, the intelligentsia, 
technocrats and private entrepreneurs were brought into the party-state 
system because they have the skills and resources desired by the Party 
to accomplish its new policy agenda (economic growth, technological 
improvement, etc.). In addition, it is safer for the Party to place these 
newly emerging classes under its direct oversight rather than leaving 
them to grow into independent powers that might ultimately become 
a threat to the dominance of the Party.  
Private entrepreneurs can be incorporated into the party-state system 
through several channels. The ﬁrst is to recruit certain private entre-
preneurs into the Party, who then become so-called 'red capitalists' 
(Dickson 2007; He and Ma 2016). The second channel is to elect private 
entrepreneurs to the People's Congress (PC) and the People's Political 
Consultative Conference at different levels (Dickson 2007; Jin 2015; Zhou 
2016). Finally, private entrepreneurs may join government-sponsored as-
sociations, such as the Private Enterprises' Association and the All-China 
Industrial and Commercial Federation (McNally and Wright 2010).
Co-opted entrepreneurs are rewarded with valuable ﬁnancial re-
sources for their loyalty to and cooperation with the party-state. Nu-
merous empirical studies conﬁrm that political connections, particularly 
membership in the PC,8 help private entrepreneurs to access bank credit 
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more easily and at a better price. For example, Bai, Lu and Tao (2006: 623) 
ﬁnd that 'access to bank loans is signiﬁcantly easier for entrepreneurs 
who are members of the Chinese People's Congress, but membership 
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference has a limited 
effect'. This conclusion is further supported by subsequent studies, such 
as Zhou (2009), Sun, Zhu and Wu (2014), Yang, Lu and Luo (2014), Feng, 
Johansson and Zhang (2015) and Zhao and Lu (2016). In addition to bank 
loan accessibility, studies show that political connections are important 
for private enterprises' access to China's stock markets (Francis, Hasan 
and Sun 2009; Liu, Tang and Tian 2013; Li and Zhou 2015). 
With the help of ﬁnancial repression policies, the Party's co-optation 
strategy appears to work well because co-opted entrepreneurs show 
strong support for the status quo, in which the Party enjoys monopolized 
political power. For example, Chen and Dickson (2008) report that pri-
vate entrepreneurs that are members of the Party (and those who have 
applied to join the Party, those who were formerly cadres and those 
who were formerly SOE managers) express signiﬁcantly higher levels 
of regime support than entrepreneurs who have no political afﬁliations 
with the party-state. Similarly, Dickson (2007) ﬁnds that private entre-
preneurs, particularly co-opted entrepreneurs, share similar viewpoints 
with communist ofﬁcials on a range of political, economic and social 
issues. He and Ma (2016) also note that private entrepreneurs who are 
members of the Party show a much higher evaluation of the Party's 
policies than entrepreneurs without such status. 
Conclusion
China's ﬁnancial repression has seriously damaged the sustainability of 
the country's economy by lowering economic efﬁciency. The severity of 
repression in China's ﬁnancial sector increased to an unprecedented level 
after 2008, when the Chinese government poured enormous ﬁnancial 
resources into the economy as a response to the ﬁnancial crisis. China's 
economy was rescued, but only for the short term, and with tremendous 
costs. The response of the party-state to the ﬁnancial crisis provides 
persuasive evidence that in China ﬁnance is not a purely economic affair 
that can be left to the market but rather is a powerful weapon that can 
be used when necessary to address certain economic, political or social 
problems that may endanger the rule of the Party.  
Stimulating the economy is certainly not the only reason for the party-
state to create and maintain ﬁnancial repression. The party-state also 
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needs a repressed ﬁnancial system to enable it to create and distribute 
rents to reward its core constituency (such as managers and employees 
of SOEs) and buy support from new emerging forces (such as private 
entrepreneurs). Whether and to what extent the Party can control the 
ﬁnancial system and subsequently direct the ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources 
is a life or death issue. Given the importance of ﬁnancial resources to the 
rule of the Party, it is difﬁcult to imagine that it will eventually adopt a 
liberalization strategy and relinquish its control over the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. From this perspective, as long as the Party can retain power, China 
may never have the chance to be free from ﬁnancial repression.
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NOTES:
1.  Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015) report that for advanced economies, real interest rates 
were negative in approximately half of the years during the 1945–1980 period; as 
a result of this repression policy, the average annual interest expense savings for 
their 12-country sample ranged from 1 to 5 per cent of GDP. They also show that 
after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, ﬁnancial repression has resurfaced in its many forms 
among the advanced economies through a variety of regulatory changes.
2.  For a more general survey on the role of ﬁnancial repression (as opposed to ﬁnancial 
liberalization) in economic development, see Loizos (2017).
3.  It may seem puzzling that China has maintained an extremely high level of saving 
(46 per cent of GDP in 2016) despite its repressed interest rate policy. There are 
two explanations for this phenomenon. First, given China's less developed and 
less diversiﬁed ﬁnancial markets, there are limited choices for Chinese households 
to address their wealth management needs. Depositing their funds in the banking 
sector (which is implicitly guaranteed by the Chinese government) seems to be 
the most convenient and the most secure arrangement. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, there are certain structural factors that contribute to China's high sav-
ing rate, including the demographic changes caused by the one-child policy, the 
breakdown of the social safety net and increasing income inequality (IMF 2017b).
4.  Estimates of the size and exposure of China's shadow banking sector vary consider-
ably. They range from approximately CNY 5 trillion to 46 trillion or approximately 
8 to 80 per cent of China's GDP. For more detailed discussions, see Elliott, Kroeber 
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and Qiao (2015) and Sharma (2014). 
5.  See 'kaiju shouji wen dashi: quanwei renshi tan dangqian zhongguo jingji (Inquiring 
into the trend at the ﬁrst year of China's 13th Five-Year Plan: authoritative person 
on China's current economic situation'. Available at: http://paper.people.com.
cn/rmrb/html/2016-05/09/nw.D110000renmrb_20160509_6-01.htm.
6.  See 'Xi stresses ﬁnancial security'. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish/2017-04/26/c_136238375.htm (accessed 3 June 2017); and 'Preventing ﬁnan-
cial risks vital to economy'. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opin-
ion/////////2017-08/15/content_30622475.htm.
7.  See 'Beijing raises spending on internal security'. Available at: https://www.ft.com/
content/f70936b0-4811-11e0-b323-00144feab49a.
8.  Studies that use different proxies for political connections, such as the Party mem-
bership of entrepreneurs (Guo et al. 2014; Li et al. 2008), government intervention 
in CEO appointments (Cull et al. 2015) and top managers (or board members) as 
ofﬁcials at certain levels (Su and Fung 2013), also conﬁrm the importance of political 
connections in helping private entrepreneurs address ﬁnancial constraints.
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